Following a 2010-11 season where the Philadelphia Flyers had the third-best record in the NHL but lost in the second round of the playoffs, the team wanted to act big in that summer. And, to their credit, they certainly did. Unfortunately, the moves they made set back the franchise, inadvertently bringing upon the least successful era in team history. Let’s revisit the 2011 offseason, led by general manager (GM) Paul Holmgren.
Lack of Faith in Bobrovsky Haunts the Flyers
Holmgren and the Flyers’ first detrimental mistake in the 2011 offseason was not trusting their young netminder, Sergei Bobrovsky. Dominant in the Kontinental Hockey League (KHL), the undrafted free agent appeared in 54 contests in his age-22 campaign in the NHL. With a .915 save percentage (SV%), 2.59 goals-against average (GAA), 3.04 goals saved above average (GSAA), and 9.75 goals saved above expected (GSAx), he was actually one of the best netminders in hockey.
Bobrovsky saw some regression in April and in the postseason, but being in the 87th percentile for GSAx at 22 years old is no easy feat. He had 15.8 GSAx prior to his final three contests, so his standing here was clear—the Flyers had something. Instead of betting on the man between the pipes who went 28-13-8 (and started out 21-6-3), they had a different plan. The Orange and Black decided to sign his replacement.
In the offseason, the Flyers signed Phoenix Coyotes goaltender Ilya Bryzgalov to a nine-year, $51 million contract worth $5.67 million annually. The 30-year-old was a Vezina Trophy finalist in 2009-10 and finished sixth in voting in 2010-11, but his three-year GSAx was a modest 3.62. Still, the thought here was simple: Bryzgalov had to be the future of the franchise between the pipes. After two spectacular regular seasons, he was in the spotlight.
Bryzgalov’s first campaign away from a strong Phoenix defense was decent for a starter, but not worth the money he was given. While he had a disastrous start to his campaign with a .891 SV%, 3.07 GAA, minus-17.1 GSAA, and minus-13.8 GSAx through Jan. 14, 2012, he rebounded quite nicely for more respectable totals by the season’s end.
Bobrovsky took a step back from his previous campaign overall, but he had an elite .921 SV%, 2.42 GAA, 3.73 GSAA, and 7.39 GSAx in that same span as Bryzgalov. Bobrovsky’s numbers plummeted as he watched his partner’s get better, but a promising netminder was quite clearly still in there somewhere.
In the postseason, Bryzgalov wasn’t the best in Phoenix and he continued that in Philadelphia. With a .887 SV% and poor advanced stats, it wasn’t a first showing to be proud of. In the summer of 2012, the Flyers decided they had seen enough of Bobrovsky even though he still had one year left on his contract—he was traded to the Columbus Blue Jackets.
Doubling down like this proved to be one of the worst decisions in not just franchise history, but one of the worst face-value moves in NHL history. Bryzgalov’s play depleted even further, leading to the last seven seasons of his deal being bought out in the 2013 offseason. As for Bobrovsky, he won the Vezina Trophy in 2012-13 now that he actually had a full-time role. Today, Bobrovsky seems like a lock for the Hall of Fame, sitting on two Vezina Trophies and a Stanley Cup victory.
Richards & Carter Trades
This is where we find a rather strange juxtaposition of ideas. While the Flyers clearly held a “win-now” mindset by signing a veteran goaltender to a big contract, they traded two of their best players in the 2011 offseason for a group of young athletes. This conflict in building for the future whilst having a fading Stanley Cup window went about as well as you might expect.
Mike Richards, the Flyers’ then-captain, prospect Rob Bordson, and Jeff Carter were dealt for a combination of youngsters and draft picks. Receiving Brayden Schenn, Wayne Simmonds, a 2012 second-round pick (traded), Jakub Voracek, a 2011 first-round pick (Sean Couturier), and a 2011 third-round pick (Nick Cousins), Philadelphia made out well on the surface. But, at the end of the day, they really didn’t.
The plus side here is that the Flyers freed up a decent chunk of money and got four 2011-12 roster players for their troubles, but they also had an established Stanley Cup window. With defensemen Kimmo Timonen and Chris Pronger aged 36 and 37 respectively, Matt Carle on an expiring deal, and a poor defensive unit without any good prospects in the system behind those three, this was a recipe for disaster.
While forwards Schenn, Simmonds, Voracek, and Couturier all went on to have fantastic NHL careers, it took a bit for all of them to reach their primes. The Orange and Black downgraded their roster significantly by trading two of their top three forward ice-time leaders from 2010-11, one of which was a consistent Selke Trophy candidate (Richards) and the other coming off of three straight 30-goal campaigns (Carter). There’s been speculation that off-ice concerns were the reason for the trades, but it’s not like that makes them justified.
The Flyers were still one of the best teams in the league thanks to Claude Giroux’s MVP-caliber season in 2011-12, but the losses of Richards and Carter were felt. Giroux’s heroic first-round series against the Pittsburgh Penguins (14 points) was only enough to win in six contests. Philadelphia lost in five games to the New Jersey Devils in the next round. Pronger’s career-ending injury earlier in the campaign didn’t help matters, but it was really a one-man show mixed with some brilliance from Danny Briere and Timonen specifically.
The Flyers lost four key players from their previous squad entering the 2012-13 campaign, those being Pronger, Carle, Jaromir Jagr, and James van Riemsdyk (he was traded for defenseman Luke Schenn). Briere was mostly a shell of himself while the depth at both ends of the ice was rather poor—the team missed the playoffs for the first time since 2006-07.
One has to think, had the Flyers maximized their Stanley Cup window, they might have more than two playoff series wins since Richards and Carter departed. Now, their primes only lasted so long (Richards had about two good seasons left) but these trades completely altered the complexion of one of the best rosters in the sport.
The Flyers’ End Result
By ridding of what allowed the 2010-11 Flyers to be in a dog fight for the top record in the standings with the eventual Stanley Cup finalist Vancouver Canucks through most of that season, the Orange and Black hurt themselves. Not only did their moves lead to a quicker evaporation of their championship window, but the decisions also didn’t help in the long term—the Flyers are paying Bryzgalov’s buyout to this day. Perhaps Richards, Carter, and Bobrovsky could have given Philadelphia a better chance at a championship in 2011-12 and beyond, taking some weight off of Giroux’s shoulders.
Again, it’s worth mentioning that players such as Schenn (the forward), Simmonds, Voracek, and Couturier were tremendous in their prime, but it didn’t really matter. The Flyers already had no future anyway, so those players wasted some of their best years on low-end playoff teams. Instead of enduring a small rebuild around Giroux and Bobrovsky once players like Pronger, Timonen, Jagr, Carle, Briere, and others departed, Philadelphia was stuck in the mud—bad enough to have zero chance at competing for a Cup but good enough to never have a top draft pick.
Following the trades of Richards, Carter, and eventually Bobrovsky, the Flyers only made minor moves to try and compete. From 2012-13 through 2023-24, they accumulated half of their franchise’s total playoff misses (eight of 16). In essence, it took them 12 seasons to accomplish what they did in the previous 44.
The current era of the Orange and Black is the darkest in history by a significant margin, and it’s mostly thanks to a shortsighted 2011 offseason. Hopefully, the team will learn from their failures back then. Holmgren typically made good moves as GM—he (possibly pressured by those around him) just had one really, really unfortunate summer.
